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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 91-712. Argued April 1, 1992-Decided June 15, 1992
Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped
from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was
arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot.
After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction,
the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it
violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's
repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its
prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had
authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had
protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper.
Held:The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his
trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal
laws. Pp.3-15.
(a)A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of
an extradition treaty. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407.
However, when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly
exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant's presence is procured
by means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436.
Thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduc-
tion, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper. Pp.3-7.
(b)Neither the Treaty's language nor the history of negotiations
and practice under it supports the proposition that it prohibits
abductions outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about
either country refraining from forcibly abducting people from the
other's territory or the consequences if an abduction occurs. In
addition, although the Mexican government was made aware of the
Ker doctrine as early as 1906, and language to curtail Ker was
drafted as early as 1935, the Treaty's current version contains no
such clause. Pp.7-11.
(c)General principles of international law provide no basis for
interpreting the Treaty to include an implied term prohibiting
international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent
and practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on
respondent's argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in
international law that there was no reason to include the prohibition
in the Treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to
extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court's decision in
Rauscher, supra, to imply a term in the extradition treaty between
the United States and England. Respondent's argument, however,
would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most
general of international law principles to support it. While respon-
dent may be correct that his abduction was ``shocking'' and in viola-
tion of general international law principles, the decision whether he
should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside the Treaty, is a
matter for the Executive Branch. Pp.11-15.
946 F.2d 1466, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., joined.